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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies find that analysts forecast earnings more optimistically but inaccurately when they face the conflict 
of interest (COI). We extend this line of research by examining whether analysts’ forecasting behavior affected by the 
mere existence of potential COI are related with underwriting contracts.  
 
We document that analysts affiliated with security companies that become underwriters ex post issue more optimistic 
but less accurate forecasts for firms to issue bonds in Korea. We also find that firms to issue bonds are likely to award 
underwriting contracts to security companies with analysts who issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this paper is to investigate whether analysts are affected by the existence and magnitude 
of potential conflict of interest (here after ‘COI’) in forecasting earnings and whether firms intending 
to issue bonds are affected by analysts’ aggressive forecasting behavior in choosing underwriters. Prior 
studies show that analysts make more optimistic but less accurate earnings forecasts or favorable stock 
recommendation when they face the COI (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 
1999; Hodgkinson 2001; Jeong, Kim & Lim, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston & Wilhelm, 2006; Chan, Karceski & 
Lakonishok, 2007). However, few studies such as Ljungqvist et al. (2006) have analyzed whether the possibility of 
getting stock underwriting contracts and expected underwriting contract fees affect analysts’ behavior and, in return, 
whether actual underwriting contracts are affected by analysts’ forecasts. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) analyze whether 
analysts issue more optimistic forecasts when they face the potential COI and the expected benefits from the potential 
COI are large, and document consistent results with their expectation. But they obtained mixed results about the effect 
of ex-ante analysts’ optimistic forecasts on underwriting contracts.  
 
In this study, we extend this line of research by examining the issues in Ljungqvist et al. (2006) in the bond market. 
This study examines how analysts forecast in general when they may face the COI. Even though many previous studies 
have analyzed forecasts and recommendations of analysts who already face the COI, few studies have examined how 
analysts are affected in general when the potential COI exists. That is, no studies have examined forecast properties 
by analysts who may face the COI but eventually do not. Most studies have focused on analysts’ forecasting behavior 
when analysts already face the COI, even when they analyze analysts’ behavior before they make underwriting 
contracts. Further, many previous studies in this area focused more on analysts in the stock market. However, 
participants in the bond market may have different decision-making problems and thereby use information differently 
(Holthausen & Watts, 2001) and the optimism in forecasts may be bigger in the bond market. This suggests that 
analysts issuing forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds are likely to have a different degree of COI from for firms 
intending to issue stocks. Therefore, it would be an interesting and important question for investors to know how 
T 
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analysts are affected in the bond market where accounting information differently affects market participants from the 
stock market. 
 
Further, the bond market has two different attributes from stock markets: i.e., transactions are less frequent in the 
secondary market and primary market participants are institutional investors. These two characteristics make analysts’ 
forecasts less important in the bond market than in the stock market, because market participants in bond markets are 
more likely to rely less on public information such as analysts’ forecasts in their decision making than those in stock 
markets, which implies the smaller cost of inaccurate forecasting for analysts. In addition, market share in the bond 
underwriting market and prior bond underwriting relationship with firms to bonds are considered as underwriters’ 
ability to help firms issue bonds on favorable terms (Ljungqvist et al. 2006). Therefore, it is very important for security 
companies to get imminent underwriting contracts from firms intending to issue bonds, even when they have to further 
sacrifice the accuracy of earnings forecasts because it will increase the possibility of getting future underwriting 
contracts. This incentive provides an environment for security companies to pressure their analysts to make more 
optimistic but less inaccurate forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds. 
 
To summarize, analysts who make forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds face a smaller cost of inaccurate 
forecasts and security companies have strong incentives to get imminent underwriting contracts. Therefore, security 
companies are more likely to pressure their analysts to issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts for firms 
intending to issue bonds. Analysts affiliated with security companies are likely to issue more optimistic forecasts for 
bond issuing firms because their forecasts are intended for a few institutional investors rather than many investors in 
the public and because the unfavorable effect due to optimistic but inaccurate forecasts on analysts’ reputation and 
affiliated companies is relatively smaller (weaker) in the bond market than in the stock market (Cowen, Groysberg & 
Healy, 2006). Further, firms intending to issue bonds are also more likely to make underwriting contracts with security 
firms whose affiliated analysts issue more optimistic forecasts because they want to issue bonds on the most favorable 
terms.  
 
We analyze 13,588 earnings forecasts for firms that issued bonds between 2000 and 2008 before underwriting 
contracts in Korea to address our research questions. The study results are as follows. First, analysts affiliated with 
security firms that had underwriting contracts ex post issued more optimistic but less accurate forecasts before 
underwriting contracts than non-affiliated analysts who also issued more optimistic but less accurate forecasts in 
general. This result suggests affiliated analysts are more affected by incentives that firms intending to issue bonds 
give or pressures underwriting security companies may give to their analysts. Second, regardless of ex post affiliation, 
analysts issued more optimistic but less accurate forecasts for firms with a larger amount of bond issuance. This further 
implies that analysts are affected more by the magnitude of expected benefits such as underwriting fees and future 
underwriting contracts. In addition, ex post affiliated analysts issued more optimistic but less accurate forecasts ex 
ante for firms with a larger amount of bond issuance than non-affiliated analysts who also issued more optimistic 
forecasts for firms intending to issue a larger amount of bonds than for other firms intending to issue bonds. Third, 
the optimism and inaccuracy of the forecasts were maximized around the time of deciding the underwriting companies. 
This result reinforces our conjectures that the analysts’ incentives to increase the possibility of gaining underwriting 
contracts lead analysts to issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts. This result was robust even after controlling 
for other variables which may have affected the attributes of analysts’ forecasts, such as analysts’ experience, 
resources available for analysts, and firm characteristics. Fourth, the increased optimism and inaccuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts were significantly and positively related with the choice of underwriting contracts, suggesting that security 
companies that have analysts who issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts are more likely to be awarded 
underwriting contracts by firms intending to issue bonds. 
 
These study results have the following contributions to the existing literature in this area. First, we explicitly identify 
the effect of potential COI that analysts face in the bond market on analysts’ forecasts. Most prior papers have shown 
the effect of COI on analysts’ forecasts by comparing affiliated analysts’ forecasts with non-affiliated forecasts after 
analysts face the COI (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Jeong et al., 2006). By analyzing forecasts 
made before underwriting contracts, we show that all analysts working for security companies with a chance to be 
underwriters generally issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts and that this tendency increases for affiliated 
analysts. That is, non-affiliated analysts also issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts for firms intending to 
issue bonds than for firms not issuing bonds. Different from prior studies that did not document the effect of COI on 
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short-term forecasts in the stock market, we document that the COI caused in the bond market significantly affects 
short-term forecasts. 
 
Third, differently from prior studies that did not find a significant relation between underwriting contracts and the 
optimism in the forecasts, we show that underwriting contracts are partly affected by the optimism in the analysts’ 
forecasts. Further, our results suggest that investors in the stock market need to take into consideration the degree of 
optimism in analysts’ forecasts for bond issuing firms when they make investment decisions for bond-issuing firms 
based on analysts’ forecasts. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes prior studies and the hypothesis development. Section 
3 provides research methods and sample selection procedures. The analysis results are presented in Section 4. Section 
5 explains the conclusions and limitations.  
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
Analysts can adjust earnings’ forecasts in response to various situations that create economic incentives. Economic 
compensation and analysts’ reputation can create incentives for analysts to bias their forecasts and sell-side analysts 
are known to increase their compensation by providing favorable forecasts to boost trading activities. Many previous 
studies also show that analysts are affected by the COI when they make earnings forecasts or stock recommendations 
(Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999; Dechow, Hutton & Sloan, 2000; Jeong 
et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2006, & Chan et al., 2007).  
 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) compare forecasts for firms with underwriting contracts by analysts affiliated with 
investment bankers with non-affiliated analysts using Investment Banker lists in Corporate Finance Bluebook between 
1983 and 1988 and find that analysts’ forecasts affiliated with investment bankers are more optimistic and favorable. 
Using 2,400 seasoned equity offerings between 1989 and 1994, Lin and McNichols (1998) analyze short-term earnings 
forecasts, long-term growth forecasts, and stock recommendations by analysts affiliated with investment bankers and 
report that analysts affiliated with investment bankers do favorably forecast long-term growth for firms under 
underwriting contracts and recommend them while they do not issue more favorable short-term forecasts for firms 
under underwriting contracts. Michaely and Womack (1999) find underwriting contracts make analysts issue more 
optimistic recommendations than other analysts after IPO by investigating 391 IPOs in 1990 and 1991. Jeong et al. 
(2006) document that analysts who work in security companies belonging to business groups issue more favorable 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms belonging to the same business groups in Korea. Dechow et 
al. (2000) also show that analysts affiliated with underwriters issue more optimistic but less accurate long-term growth 
forecasts. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) also examine whether analysts bias their forecasts, are more aggressive when 
potential fee income from investment banking services is larger, and analysts’ behavior increases the likelihood of 
getting underwriting contracts. Consistent with previous studies, they report that analysts affiliated with investment 
bankers issue favorable forecasts and become more aggressive when potential fee income is larger, but do not find 
any evidence that the chance of getting underwriting contracts has been increased by analysts’ aggressive behavior. 
Chan et al. (2007) examine whether analysts tied to investment banking adjust earnings forecasts immediately prior 
to earnings announcements enough to match or exceed actual earnings and document that forecast error distribution 
is shifted prior to earnings announcement in favor of firms, suggesting that analysts revise earnings forecasts to help 
managers. 
 
We address our research question in the bond market. While accounting information under GAAP provides useful 
information for various kinds of decision makers, such as debt security investors, creditors, clients, employees, and 
stock investors, information about credit such as bankruptcy possibility and solvency (debt repaying ability) is more 
useful for bond investors, which is different from stock equity investors (Holthausen & Watts ,2001; Watts 2003). 
Because the possibility of repayment of principal and interest is the most important consideration for bonds, bond 
investors may consider that information such as the severity of financial difficulties, liquidity, and solvency is more 
important in bond-related decision making than the future prospects of firms. That is, bond investors are more 
concerned about bond issuing firms’ inability to repay and the lower limit of net asset value (Watts 2003). Therefore, 
information about future growth potential or firm value increase due to firms’ business prospects may be less useful 
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in the bond market than in the stock market (Holthausen & Watts 2001), implying that the kind of useful information 
may differ across different markets and decision-making problems. 
 
This suggests the need to analyze the characteristics and usefulness of accounting information examined in the stock 
market in different markets, such as the bond market. Further, different from stock markets, large institutional 
investors are primary market participants for bonds. Institutional investors such as investment trust companies and 
pension funds can easily raise a large amount of capital. Even when underwriting companies sell bonds which they 
have to directly take from bond issuing companies at the time of issuance, most of these bonds are also purchased by 
institutional investors (Kim, Kim, Woo & Lee, 2009). That is, market participants in the bond market are primarily 
institutional investors, while those in the primary stock market are primarily individual investors. In addition, because 
there are not many market participants in the bond market, transactions are less frequent than in the stock market, 
which prevents inaccurate earnings forecasts in the bond market from hurting analysts’ reputation as much as in the 
stock market. Further, security companies may need to take a different approach to access the market in order to secure 
underwriting contracts, because bond issuances are less frequent than stock issuances. When managers have more 
private information about firms, they prefer to raise capital via debts to stocks (Grinblatt & Titman 1998). Specifically, 
because inaccurate forecasts may hurt analysts’ reputation less in the bond market than in the stock market, and 
because the economic incentives that analysts may face in the bond market could be affected by different factors (Das, 
Levine & Sivaramakrishnan, 1998; Cowen et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2006), analysts are more likely to provide 
favorable forecasts which reflect the bond market characteristics.  
 
As documented in prior studies for forecasts after the COI is known and based on the above discussion, we expect 
analysts affiliated with underwriters to issue more optimistic forecasts than non-affiliated analysts. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is as follows.    
 
Hypothesis 1: Ex ante earnings forecasts issued by ex post affiliated analysts with security companies for firms 
intending to issue bonds are more optimistic and less accurate than those issued by ex post non-affiliated analysts. 
 
In the case of large expected benefits from underwriting contracts, analysts are more likely to be affected by the 
magnitude of the expected benefits and we expect analysts who are affiliated with security companies that become 
underwriters to issue more optimistic and less accurate forecasts. Therefore, our second and third hypotheses are as 
follows.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Ex ante analysts’ forecasts are more optimistic and less accurate for a larger amount of bond issuance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ex ante earnings forecasts issued by ex post affiliated analysts for firms intending to issue a larger 
amount of bonds are more optimistic and less accurate than those issued by ex post non-affiliated analysts.  
 
We also examine the question of whether underwriting contracts are influenced by biases in analysts’ forecasts. Even 
though Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Chan et al. (2007) examine whether analysts are influenced by the desire to win 
underwriting contracts in their forecasts, they do not provide evidence that underwriting contracts are positively related 
to the biases in affiliated analysts’ forecasts. Because the cost of inaccurate forecasts is expected to be smaller for 
analysts in the bond market, we set our final hypothesis as follows.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms intending to issue bonds are more likely to award bond underwriting contracts to security firms 
whose analysts issue ex ante more optimistic but less accurate forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
As discussed in the previous section, we address four empirical questions: (1) whether ex post affiliated analysts’ 
forecasts are more biased or less accurate than non-affiliated analysts’ forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds, (2) 
whether the amount of bond to be issued has a significant impact on analysts’ forecast properties, (3) whether affiliated 
analysts’ forecasts are more biased or less accurate in proportion with the amount of bond to be issued, and (4) whether 
firms intending to issue bonds are affected by the degree of optimism in analysts’ forecasts in awarding underwriting 
contracts. To test for our research questions, we regress the properties of analysts’ forecasts, measured by bias and 
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accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, against underwriting contract dummy, amount of bond to be issued and other control 
variables that potentially affect analysts’ forecasts, as follows.  
 
BIAS (or ACCU) =α0+α1UNWRTi,t+α2MAGNIi,t+α3SIZEi,t+α4LEVi,t+α5VOLi,t+α6BMi,t+α7ROEi,t 
+ α8DAYGAPi,t+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ ε   (1) 
 
BIAS (or ACCU)=β0+ β1UNWRTi,t+ β2MAGNIi,t+ β3(UNWRT×MAGNI)i,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ β5LEVi,t 
+ β6VOLi,t+ β7BMi,t+ β8ROEi,t+ β9DAYGAPi,t + Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ  (2) 
 
UNWRT(1 or 0)=β0+ β1Bias(Accuracy)i,t+ β2HOUSE_MSi,t+ β3SAME_HSi,t+ β4HOUSE_ASTi,t 
+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ  (3) 
 
where: i denotes firm, t denotes years for FY 2000~FY2008, BIAS is the difference between actual and forecasted 
earnings divided by market value of equity measured at three months after fiscal year end, ACCU is the absolute value 
of BIAS, BOND is a dummy variable that equals ‘1’ if firms intend to issue bonds in year t, UNWRT is a dummy 
variable that equals ‘1’ if analysts are affiliated with security companies which become underwriter for firms intending 
to issue bonds, MAGNI is the amount of bond to be issued, scaled by market value of equity, SIZE is a natural logarithm 
of total assets, LEV is leverage measured by dividing total liabilities with total assets, VOL is the volatility of daily 
stock price, BM is book-to-market ratio calculated by dividing net book value by market value of equity, ROE is return 
on equity, and DAYGAP is a natural logarithm of number of days from forecast reporting to issuance of bond. 
HOUSE_MS is the 3 year-average underwriting amount of bond by the security company to which an analyst belongs. 
SAME_HS is a dummy variable that equals ‘1’ if a security company has experience of providing underwriting services 
to firms intending to issue bonds during the previous 3-years1. HOUSE_AST is the total assets of a security company.  
 
From models (1) to (3), dependent variables are earnings forecast bias (BIAS) and accuracy (ACCU). Following prior 
studies, we calculate BIAS as the difference between actual earnings before extra-ordinary items and forecasted 
earnings scaled with market value of equity 3-months after fiscal year-end (Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Lin & McNichols, 
1998; Jeong et al., 2006; Ahn, Yoo, Cho, Shin & Chang, 2006), and ACCU as the unsigned difference between actual 
and forecasted earnings divided by market value of equity.  
 
In models (1) and (2), the coefficients on UNWRT indicate the differences in forecast properties between non-affiliated 
and affiliated analysts. Prior studies show that the incentive to raise future economic benefits by being nominated as 
an underwriter can force analysts who are affiliated with security companies that provide underwriting services to 
issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts. Hence, if our conjecture is right, we expect that the coefficient 
estimates on UNWRT for BIAS (ACCU) are significantly negative (positive).  
 
The amount of bonds to be issued (MAGNI) can influence analysts to issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts 
for firms intending to issue bonds, regardless of underwriting contracts. In models (1) and (2), the coefficients on 
MAGNI can be interpreted as the degree of general influence over analysts’ forecasts from the economic incentive 
created by the amount of bond to be issued. In addition, we can interpret that the coefficients on UNWRT×MAGNI 
show the difference in optimism of forecasts between affiliated analysts and non-affiliated analysts due to economic 
incentives caused by the amount of bond to be issued. We expect that the coefficients on MAGNI and on 
UNWRT×MAGNI for BIAS (ACCU) are significantly negative (positive). 
 
We use firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), volatility (VOL), book-to-market ratio (BM), return on equity (ROE), and 
the horizon (DAYGAP) as control variables based on prior literature. SIZE is considered to proxy many causes such 
as variation in information environment, complexity and the degree of competition among analysts which affect 
analysts’ forecasts (Bhushan, 1989; Duru & Reeb, 2002; Gu & Wu, 2003). Bhushan (1989) documents that large firms 
have more analyst followings and that analysts’ forecasts for large firms are likely to be less biased and more accurate 
																																								 																				
1 We calculated HOUSE_MS for 2001(2000) as 2-year (1 year) average underwriting amount of bond by the security company to which an analyst 
belongs. SAME_HS for 2003 and 2002 equals ‘1’ if we can observe that a security company has experience of providing underwriting service to 
firms to issue bonds during the previous 2 years and 1 year, respectively. For 2000, we assume SAME_HS as ‘0’ because the initiation date of the 
sample is inevitably censored. To check the consistency of our results, we re-estimated our models with 10,754 observations (2003~ 2008) and un-
tabulated results illustrate that the incorporation of reduced samples into the models does not significantly change our findings. 
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because large firms have rich information environment. However, Duru and Reeb (2002) argue that SIZE indicates 
more complexity and thus induces greater forecast errors. Das et al. (1998) argue that analysts have stronger incentive 
to issue more optimistically to facilitate access to information for less predictable firms. Further, Gu and Wu (2003) 
argue that if SIZE is positively correlated with analyst following, it can lead to more intensive competition among 
analysts and document that analysts issue more biased and less accurate forecasts for large company, to earn managers’ 
favor more. Because the prior literature indicates mixed results for the effect of size on analysts’ forecasts, we do not 
clearly predict the sign on SIZE. Because LEV is known to be positively correlated with upward earnings manipulation 
(Healy & Wahlen 1999), we predict negative (positive) coefficient estimates on LEV for BIAS (ACCU). The volatility 
of stock return is expected to be positively correlated with forecasts’ bias and inaccuracy because the volatility of 
business projects operated by firms decreases the predictability of future earnings. When uncertainty is larger in 
forecasting earnings, analysts are more likely to issue biased and less accurate reports (Lee & Jeong 1993; Duru & 
Reeb 2002; Jeong 2003; Ahn et al. 2006; Han, Joo & Kim, 2005). Thus, we expect return VOL to be negatively 
(positively) related to BIAS (ACCU). We include BM and ROE to control the tendency on the forecast for firms with 
good future prospects (Francis & Willis 2000; Gu & Wu 2003; Han et al. 2005) and expect positive (negative) 
coefficient estimates on BM and ROE for BIAS (ACCU), respectively. Kang, O’Brien & Sivaramakrishnan, (1994) 
and Das et al. (1998) show that analysts forecast more optimistically for longer horizons. To control for this, we 
include a natural logarithm of days from forecast to issuance date (DAYGAP). Finally, we include dummy variables 
to control for industry and calendar year effects. 
 
In model (3), we expect the coefficients on BIAS (ACCU) to be significantly negative (positive), because firms 
intending to issue bonds also want to make underwriting contracts with security companies whose affiliated analysts 
issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts. It is more likely that security companies whose affiliated analysts 
issue more optimistic but less accurate forecasts will offer firms intending to issue bonds favorable terms of bond 
issuance. We also control variables known to affect the choice of underwriter in prior studies.  Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
show that the market share in the underwriting contract market (HOUSE_MS) and the past experience of providing 
underwriting services to firms intending to issue bonds (SAME_HS) are the two primary factors that affect the decision 
of underwriters. Luo, Rao & Yue, (2010) also show that underwriter reputation affects the choice of underwriter by 
firms. The market share of underwriting contracts is considered to represent the general ability of security companies 
to provide underwriting services and the past experience of providing underwriting services indicates the specific 
knowledge (ability) of security companies to provide underwriting services to firms intending to issue bonds. We 
expect both variables are significantly positively related with the choice of underwriters (UNWRT). Furthermore, we 
include total assets of security companies (HOUSE_AST) as an additional control variable because the resources of 
security companies are considered as the general ability of providing underwriting services. We also expect the 
positive coefficient on this variable as two other control variables.  
 
4. SAMPLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1. Sample 
 
We use listed firms in the stock market in Korea (Korea Stock Exchange, KSE and Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation, KOSDAQ) and initially collect data for firms that issued corporate bonds from 2000 to 2008. 
We retrieve financial data, corporate bond data and analysts’ forecast data from KIS-Value Library and Fn-Guide2, 
respectively. For firms intending to issue bonds, only analyst forecasts prior to bond issuance date are retrieved. From 
the initial sample, we delete firms in the financial industry and non-December fiscal year-end firms. For the tests of 
hypotheses 1 to 3, we use forecasts only for firms intending to issue bonds by affiliated and non-affiliated analysts. 
Forecasts that meet our sample selection criteria are 12,496 individual non-affiliated analysts’ forecasts (1,260 non-
affiliated analysts in 240 houses) and 1,092 individual affiliated analysts’ reports (151 affiliated analysts in 78 houses) 
for 186 firms who newly issued corporate bonds.  
  
																																								 																				
2 KIS-Value Library and Fn-Guide provide financial statement and analysts’ forecasts data and are compatible with Compustat and I/B/E/S in the 
U.S, respectively. 
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Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Fiscal 
Year 
Non-affiliated [UNWRT=0] Affiliated [UNWRT =1] Total 
#Forecast 
[ % ] # House #Analyst # Firms 
#Forecast 
[ % ] # House #Analyst # Firms 
#Forecast 
[ % ] 
2000 363 [2.67%] 20 53 32 
60 
[0.44%] 6 9 32 
423 
[3.11%] 
2001 1,453 [10.69%] 27 107 30 
167 
[1.23%] 9 19 30 
1,620 
[11.92%] 
2002 718 [5.28%] 27 95 14 
73 
[0.54%] 8 12 14 
791 
[5.82%] 
2003 862 [6.34%] 29 148 15 
74 
[0.54%] 8 16 15 
936 
[6.89%] 
2004 2,356 [17.34%] 30 247 24 
204 
[1.50%] 11 26 24 
2,560 
[18.84%] 
2005 2,380 [17.52%] 29 181 18 
190 
[1.40%] 10 18 18 
2,570 
[18.91%] 
2006 1,850 [13.61%] 25 116 11 
108 
[0.79%] 8 10 11 
1,958 
[14,41%] 
2007 905 [6,66%] 25 146 20 
92 
[0.68%] 8 20 20 
997 
[7.34%] 
2008 1,609 [11.84%] 28 167 22 
124 
[0.91%] 10 21 22 
1,733 
[12,75%] 
Total 12,496 [91.96%] 240 1,260 186 
1,092 
[8.04%] 78 151 186 
13,588 
[100.00%] 
#Forecast is the number of report observations, #House is the number of houses that issued analysts’ report, and #Firms is the number of firms that 
issued corporate bond 
  
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panels A and B of Table 2 provide the descriptive statistics and overall difference of key variables between affiliated 
and non-affiliated analysts. BIAS and ACCU mean (median) values for all firms are -0.03 (-0.01) and 0.04 (0.02), 
indicating that analysts provide optimistic but inaccurate forecasts in general (Fried & Givoly, 1982; Klein, 1990; 
Francis & Philbrick, 1993; Das et al. 1998). Further, BIAS and ACCU mean (median) value for firms intending to 
issue bonds are -0.04 (-0.01) and 0.06 (0.02), suggesting that analysts provide more optimistic but less accurate 
forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds than other firms. 
 
The mean (median) differences in BIAS and ACCU between firms intending to issue bonds and other firms, and 
affiliated and non-affiliated analysts are all statistically significant at the 1% level, but the median difference in BIAS 
between firms intending to issue bonds and other firms. However, most of the control variables are also significantly 
different between firms intending to issue bonds and other firms, and between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts. 
This reveals a possibility that the differences in the properties of analysts’ forecasts may not be caused by our variables 
of interest, i.e., bond issuance and affiliation of analysts’ analysts with underwriters. We examine this issue in multiple 
regressions later.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variables Observations Mean 1% 1
st 
Quantile Median 
3rd 
Quantile 99% 
Standard 
Deviation 
BIAS 13,588 -0.04 -0.73 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.12 0.12 
ACCU 13,588 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.73 0.11 
UNWRT 13,588 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 
MAGNI 13,588 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.38 0.06 
SIZE (bill won) 13,588 8,402 129 2,136 5,317 13,376 29,587 7,809 
LEV 13,588 0.51 0.19 0.40 0.53 0.61 0.80 0.14 
VOL 13,588 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.06 
BM 13,588 0.69 0.09 0.38 0.58 0.93 2.43 0.44 
ROE 13,588 0.05 -1.64 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.28 
DGAP(days) 13,588 260 117 210 267 320 364 69 
 
Panel B. Mean (Median) Difference of Key Variables 
Variables 
Mean Difference Median Difference 
UNWRT=0 [A] 
(N=12,496) 
UNWRT =1 [B] 
(N=1,092) 
Mean-Diff 
t([A]-[B]) 
UNWRT =0 [A] 
(N=12,496) 
UNWRT =1 [B] 
(N=1,092) 
Median-Diff 
z([A]-[B]) 
BIAS -0.03 -0.07 0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01*** 
ACCU 0.05 0.09 -0.04*** 0.02 0.03 -0.01*** 
MAGNI 0.05 0.06 -0.01*** 0.02 0.04 -0.02*** 
SIZE (bill won) 8,528 6,957 1,571*** 5,625 4,239 1,386*** 
LEV 0.51 0.54 -0.03*** 0.52 0.54 -0.02*** 
VOL 0.18 0.19 -0.01*** 0.18 0.19 -0.01*** 
BM 0.69 0.62 0.07*** 0.60 0.53 0.07*** 
ROE 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.00 
DGAP(days) 260 262 -2.00 266 270 -4.00 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
 
 
4.3. Correlation 
 
As a preliminary check on whether underwriting relationship affects affiliated analysts’ forecast properties, we 
calculate correlations among key variables used in our analyses. We report Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients 
in the upper/under diagonal in Table 3. Consistent with our predictions, the correlation between BIAS (ACCU) and 
UNWRT is -0.074 (0.079) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting affiliated analysts issue more optimistic but less 
accurate forecasts. As expected, the correlation between BIAS (ACCU) and MAGNI is positive (negative): the 
coefficient estimates on MAGNI for BIAS (ACCU) are -0.387 and 0.395 and are significant at the 1% level. Spearman 
correlation coefficients are generally similar to Pearson correlation. We also calculate the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) values among the key variables to check the multicollinearity problem, but find that none of the VIF values 
exceed 2.57 in any of the regressions, demonstrating an absence of any significant multicollinearity issue in the 
subsequent multivariate regressions.   
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix (p-values in parenthesis) 
Sp
ea
rm
an
 
Variables Pearson BIAS ACCU UNWRT MAGNI SIZE LEV VOL BM ROE DGAP 
BIAS  -0.921 -0.074 -0.387 0.070 -0.251 -0.336 0.262 0.229 -0.074  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ACCU -0.483  0.079 0.395 -0.055 0.295 0.361 -0.296 -0.189 0.090 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNWRT -0.037 0.054  0.075 -0.068 0.058 0.069 -0.044 -0.005 0.005 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.53) 
MAGNI -0.388 0.282 0.076  -0.430 0.297 0.302 -0.405 -0.041 -0.005 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.55) 
SIZE 0.107 -0.029 -0.064 -0.548  -0.102 -0.172 -0.004 0.035 -0.004 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.00) (0.61) 
LEV -0.177 0.214 0.054 0.193 -0.151  0.272 -0.400 -0.132 -0.034 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
VOL -0.213 0.325 0.069 0.323 -0.219 0.298  -0.247 -0.180 -0.120 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BM 0.313 -0.420 -0.054 -0.521 0.041 -0.468 -0.339  0.097 0.077 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ROE 0.313 -0.180 0.006 -0.270 0.125 -0.050 -0.260 0.308  -0.001 (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.91) 
DGAP -0.025 0.086 0.006 -0.037 0.013 -0.032 -0.115 0.086 0.013  (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14)  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Difference in the Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts for Firms Intending to Issue Bonds Between Affiliated 
and Non-Affiliated Analysts 
 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 compare the properties of analysts’ forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds between 
affiliated and non-affiliated analysts. Therefore, we only use analysts’ forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds in 
the analysis.  
 
First, we univariately compare whether the difference in the properties of analysts’ forecasts between affiliated and 
non-affiliated analysts differs depending on the forecast horizon and the amount of bonds to be issued. Table 4 shows 
the overall difference in analysts forecast according to the affiliation. More specifically, Panels A and B of Table 5 
show the results of overall difference in analysts forecast over the forecast horizon based on the upper and lower 25% 
sub-samples based on the amount of bonds to be issued (MAGNI).  
 
From Table 4, in general, we observe that the amount of newly issued corporate bonds significantly affects analysts’ 
forecasts, and that this effect is stronger for affiliate analysts’ forecasts than for those of non-affiliate analysts. More 
specifically, we find that, 6 months to 5 months before bond issuance, affiliated analysts issue more optimistic and 
less accurate forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds in the upper 25% amount. For example, the mean difference 
of bias (BIAS) between non-affiliated and affiliated analysts’ forecasts for firms in the upper 25% bond issuance is 
0.062, significant at 5%, while the mean difference of bias (BIAS) between non-affiliated and affiliated analysts’ 
forecasts for firms in the lower 25% bond issuance is only 0.022 and insignificant. The mean difference of the accuracy 
(ACCU) is also generally similar to the mean difference on the bias (BIAS), i.e., the mean difference of accuracy 
(ACCU) between non-affiliated and affiliated analysts’ forecasts for firms in the upper 25% bond issuance (-0.057) is 
significantly smaller than the mean difference of accuracy (ACCU) between non-affiliated and affiliated analyst’s 
forecasts for firms in the lower 25% bond issuance (-0.028). These differences decrease as the forecasts approach the 
bond issuance date.  
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Table 4. Univariate Test Results of Forecast Optimism and Accuracy by the Amount of Bonds to be Issued and forecast horizon 
Panel A. Upper 25% in the amount of Corporate Bonds to be issued 
Parameter 
Number of 
Months before 
Issuance 
BIAS ACCU # of Obs. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 Diff. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 Diff. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 
Mean 
1~2 month 
before -0.105 -0.137 0.032
** 0.122 0.148 -0.026* 1,051 164 
3~4 month 
before -0.117 -0.129 0.012 0.138 0.154 -0.016 867 123 
5~6 month 
before -0.099 -0.161 0.062
** 0.128 0.185 -0.057** 617 94 
Median 
1~2 month 
before -0.037 -0.056 0.019
* 0.042 0.066 -0.024 1,051 164 
3~4 month 
before -0.043 -0.041 -0.002 0.052 0.063 -0.011 867 123 
5~6 month 
before -0.034 -0.035 0.001 0.053 0.057 -0.004 617 94 
 
Panel B. Lower 25% in Magnitude of Newly Issued Corporate Bond 
Parameter 
Number of 
Months before 
Issuance 
BIAS ACCU # of Obs. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 Diff. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 Diff. 
UNWRT 
=0 
UNWRT 
=1 
Mean 
1~2 month 
before -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.023 0.023 0.000 1,120 61 
3~4 month 
before -0.000 -0.009 0.008 0.024 0.041 -0.017
*** 944 66 
5~6 month 
before 0.001 -0.021 0.022 0.037 0.066 -0.029
*** 740 45 
Median 
1~2 month 
before 0.002 0.012 -0.010 0.015 0.019 -0.004 1,120 61 
3~4 month 
before 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.019 0.030 -0.011
*** 944 66 
5~6 month 
before 0.002 -0.006 0.008 0.028 0.056 -0.028
*** 740 45 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
 
 
To summarize, these findings indicate that affiliated analysts generally issue more optimistic and less accurate 
forecasts than non-affiliated analysts for firms intending to issue bonds when the forecast horizon is long, i.e., 
underwriters are more likely yet to be determined. Further, the results also indicate that analysts’ forecasts are likely 
to be more optimistic and less accurate mainly due to the magnitude of COI induced from the bond issuance amount.  
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Table 5. Regression Results; Forecast Properties of Analysts in Underwriting House 
Panel A. Forecast Bias 
BIAS (or ACCU)= α0+α1UNWRTi,t+α2MAGNIi,t+α3SIZEi,t+α4LEVi,t+α5VOLi,t+α6BMi,t+α7ROEi,t+ α8DAYGAPi,t+ Industry_Fixed 
+ Year_Fixed+ ε 
Independent 
Variable Sign 
Dependent Variable = BIAS 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A 0.256***  8.06 0.572***  17.63 
UNWRT − -0.020***  -6.17 -0.017***  -5.53 
MAGNI −   -0.558*** -30.54 
SIZE ? -0.000  -0.34 -0.011***  -13.23 
LEV − -0.210***  -24.26 -0.189***  -22.40 
VOL − -0.282***  -11.32 -0.204***  -8.40 
BM + 0.026***  9.90 -0.004  -1.53 
ROE + 0.093***  24.56 0.090*** 24.39 
DGAP − -0.050***  -16.75 -0.044  -15.33 
Adj. R2 26.50% 31.22% 
F-Value 234.26*** 281.35*** 
# Of Samples 13,588 13,588 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
Max VIF 2.54 2.57 
 
Panel B. Forecast Accuracy 
Independent 
Variable Sign 
Dependent Variable = ACCU 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A -0.455***   -15.41 -0.758***   -25.23 
UNWRT + 0.020  6.90 0.018 *** 6.27 
MAGNI +   0.536*** 31.67 
SIZE ? 0.004***   4.50 0.013***   17.61 
LEV + 0.215***   26.73 0.194***   24.93 
VOL + 0.534***   23.13 0.459 *** 20.49 
BM − -0.022***   -9.47 0.006**  2.34 
ROE − -0.072***   -20.58 -0.069***   -20.29 
DGAP + 0.056***   20.38 0.051***   19.06 
Adj. R2 29.17% 34.04% 
F-Value 267.40*** 319.71*** 
# Of Samples 13,588 13,588 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
Max VIF 2.54 2.57 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
 
 
Because most control variables are significantly different between affiliated analysts and non-affiliated analysts, we 
run multivariate regressions using model (1) to test hypotheses 1 to 2. Table 6 reports the regression results of equation 
(1) using analysts’ forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds. In general, the results are consistent with the 
predictions of our hypotheses 1 and 2. First, the coefficients on affiliation dummy variable (UNWRT) for optimism 
and accuracy (BIAS and ACCU) are -0.020 (0.020) for equation (1), which are significant at the 1% level. This result 
implies that potential underwriting relationship in bond issuance induces ex post affiliated analysts to issue more 
optimistic and less accurate forecasts than ex post non-affiliated analysts. In addition, the coefficients on the amount 
of bond issuance (MAGNI) for optimism and accuracy (BIAS and ACCU) are -0.558 (0.536), which are also significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates that analysts’ forecasting behavior is significantly affected by the amount of newly 
issued corporate bond in a more optimistic and less accurate way, which is consistent with our third hypothesis. 
 
We estimate equation (2) to test hypothesis 3 by adding the variable which measures the intervening effect of bond 
issuing amount on underwriting relationship. The results are reported in Table 6. Table 6 shows that the amount of 
bond issuance strengthens affiliated analysts’ optimistic and inaccurate forecasts, i.e., the coefficients on 
UNWRT×MAGNI for BIAS (ACCU) are -0.386 (0.397). This finding suggests that the amount of corporate bond to be 
issued increases the COI which analysts face and thus more strongly affects affiliated analysts’ forecasting behavior. 
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The ex post underwriting relation also forces analysts’ forecasts to be more optimistic and less accurate, as in the 
estimation of equation (2). The amount of bond to be issued also generally affects ex post non-affiliated analysts’ 
forecasts optimistically and inaccurately.  
 
Control variables generally show signs that are consistent with our predictions. The coefficient estimates on SIZE for 
optimism and accuracy (BIAS and ACCU) are significantly negative (positive) at the 1% level, indicating that analysts 
issue less biased and more accurate forecasts due to more information available for firms (Gu & Wu 2003). The 
coefficients on LEV and return VOL for BIAS and accuracy (BIAS and ACCU) are also negative and positive at the 1% 
level, respectively, indicating that future earnings for firms that are highly leveraged or volatile in return are less 
predictable (Lee & Jeong, 1993; Jeong, 2003; Ahn et al., 2006; Han et al., 2005). Finally, the signs in coefficient 
estimates on ROE and DAYGAP are also consistent with our expectation.  
 
 
Table 6. Regression Results; Incremental Effects of Forecast Properties of Analysts in Underwriting House 
BIAS (or ACCU)= β0+ β1UNWRTi,t+ β2MAGNIi,t+ β3(UNWRT×MAGNI)i,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ β5LEVi,t+ β6VOLi,t+ β7BMi,t + β8ROEi,t+ β9DAYGAPi,t  
+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent 
Variable 
Sign Dependent Variable = BIAS Dependent Variable = ACCURACY 
BIAS ACCURACY Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A N/A 0.567*** 17.51 -0.753*** -25.13 
UNWRT − + -0.012*** -3.89 0.013*** 4.46 
MAGNI − + -0.543*** -29.68 0.521*** 30.75 
UNWRT×MAGNI − + -0.386*** -9.21 0.397*** 10.23 
SIZE ? ? -0.011*** -13.10 0.013*** 17.49 
LEV − + -0.184*** -21.89 0.189*** 24.37 
VOL − + -0.209*** -8.67 0.465*** 20.83 
BM + − -0.004 -1.55 0.006** 2.36 
ROE + − 0.090*** 24.67 -0.070*** -20.59 
DGAP − + -0.044*** -15.41 0.051*** 19.17 
Adj.R2 − 34.54% 
F-Value 274.47*** 312.70*** 
# Of Samples 13,588 13,588 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
Max VIF 2.57 2.57 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
 
 
5.2. Possibility of Awarding Underwriting Contract According to The Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
To test hypothesis 4, we run logit regression for equation (3) and present the results in Table 7. We expect the 
coefficients on BIAS and ACCU to be significantly negative and positive, respectively, because we expect that the 
more analysts forecast optimistically and less accurately, the more likely security companies will secure underwriting 
contracts.  The coefficients on BIAS and ACCU are significantly negative (-1.719) and positive (1.997) at the 1% level, 
respectively, which is consistent with our expectation. The marginal effects on BIAS and ACCU are -0.128 and 0.153, 
respectively, indicating that 1% increase in BIAS (ACCU) results in -0.128% (0.153%) decrease (increase) in the 
probability of awarding underwriting contract. That is, the more optimistically and less accurately analysts issue 
forecasts for firms intending to issue bonds, the more likely security companies that hire those analysts can secure 
underwriting contracts. The market share of underwriting (HOUSE_MS) and size of underwriting 
companies(HOUSE_AST) are also positively related with underwriting contracts, suggesting that security companies 
that have a large market share of underwriting contracts and asset size have significantly higher chances of securing 
underwriting contracts in the bond market. In general, these results are consistent with prior studies.    
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Table 7. Results of Logit Regression; Likelihood of Bond Underwriting Contracts to Security Firms 
UNWRT (1 or 0)= β0+ β1Bias(Accuracy)i,t+ β2HOUSE_MSi,t+ β3SAME_HSi,t+ β4HOUSE_ASTi,t+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent 
Variable 
Sign Dependent Variable=UNWRT 
BIAS ACCU Estimate Wald  Chi-square 
Marginal 
Effect Estimate 
Wald  
Chi-square 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept N/A N/A -7.919*** 39.53  -7.818*** 38.50  
BIAS(ACCU) − + -1.719*** 56.31 -0.128 1.997*** 73.17 0.153 
HOUSE_MS + 0.245*** 12.89 0.017 0.251*** 13.30 0.018 
SAME_HST + 0.032 0.06 0.0003 0.078 0.37 0.004 
HOUST_AST + 0.196*** 28.34 0.015 0.189*** 26.08 0.014 
Pseudo R2 3.26% 3.50% 
Likelihood Ratio(χ2) 191.10*** 205.16*** 
# Of Samples 13,588 13,588 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
 
 
6. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
 
We perform several additional analyses to check the robustness of the results documented in the previous sections. 
First, we re-estimate equations (1) ~ (3) by using a sub-sample from 6 to 3 months before bond issuance to check how 
the forecast horizon before bond issuance affects the analysts’ forecasts. If the incentive to gain economic benefits as 
an underwriter forces analysts to issue more optimistic forecasts, affiliated analysts’ forecasts will be more biased and 
less accurate before underwriting contracts are made. We use forecasts made before 6 to 3 months before bond 
issuance in the estimation, because it usually takes about a quarter to gain underwriting contracts. Therefore, we 
assume forecasts 6 to 3 months prior to bond issuance are made before bond issuance. This restriction reduces the 
sample size to 4,784 forecasts and the estimation results are reported in Table 8.  
 
The coefficients on affiliation with underwriters (UNWRT) and the amount of bond issuance (MAGNI) and the 
interaction of both variables (UNWRT×MAGNI) are significantly negative (positive) at the 1% level for BIAS (ACCU). 
This is consistent with the result in the previous section. That is, ex post affiliated analysts are more likely to make 
more optimistic and less accurate forecasts than non-affiliated analysts before underwriting contracts, all analysts issue 
more optimistic and less accurate forecasts when the expected magnitude of economic benefits is large, and affiliated 
analysts are affected more by the magnitude of economic benefits.  
 
Second, we re-estimate equation (4) and present the results in Panel C of Table 8 by using a sub-sample from 6 to 3 
months before bond issuance to check how the forecast horizon before bond issuance affects the likelihood of awarding 
bond underwriting contract (UNWRT). As presented, the coefficients on BIAS and ACCU are significantly negative (-
1.636) and positive (1.980) at the 1% level, respectively, which is consistent with the results in Table 7. Also, the 
marginal effects on BIAS and ACCU are -0.113 and 0.014, respectively. In addition, consistent with the results in 
Table 7, the size of underwriting companies (HOUSE_AST) is still positively related with underwriting contracts at 
the 1% level (0.220 and 0.209, respectively) and their marginal effects on (BIAS and ACCU) are 0.015 and 0.014, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Regression Results Forecast Properties of Analysts before Underwriting Contract 
Panel A. Forecast Bias 
BIAS (or ACCU)= β0+ β1UNWRTi,t+ β2MAGNIi,t+ β3(UNWRT×MAGNI)i,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ β5LEVi,t+ β6VOLi,t+ β7BMi,t+ β8ROEi,t 
+ β9DAYGAPi,t + Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent Variable Sign Dependent Variable = BIAS Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A 1.178 *** 15.85 1.161*** 15.69 
UNWRT − -0.021 *** -3.81 -0.014*** -2.41 
MAGNI − -0.448*** -13.39 -0.432*** -12.96 
UNWRT×MAGNI −   -0.545*** -7.05 
SIZE ? -0.010***  -6.57 -0.009*** -6.42 
LEV − -0.250 *** -16.73 -0.243*** -16.32 
VOL − -0.240***  -5.32 -0.242*** -5.39 
BM + -0.004  -0.76 -0.004 -0.88 
ROE + 0.116 *** 16.27 0.117*** 16.44 
DGAP − -0.141***  -14.26 -0.141*** -14.27 
Adj.R2 34.51% 35.17% 
F-Value 121.01*** 118.95*** 
# Of Samples 4,784 4,784 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
Max VIF 2.72 2.72 
 
Panel B. Forecast Accuracy 
Independent Variable Sign Dependent Variable = ACCURACY Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A -1.202*** -17.27 -1.183*** -17.11 
UNWRT + 0.025*** 4.83 0.017*** 3.18 
MAGNI + 0.437*** 13.97 0.420*** 13.48 
UNWRT×MAGNI +   0.598*** 8.27 
SIZE ? 0.012*** 8.65 0.012*** 8.49 
LEV + 0.260*** 18.57 0.253*** 18.13 
VOL + 0.444*** 10.50 0.446*** 10.63 
BM − 0.005 1.05 0.005 1.20 
ROE − -0.095*** -14.23 -0.096*** -14.43 
DGAP + 0.127*** 13.67 0.126*** 13.69 
Adj.R2 35.66% 36.56% 
F-Value 127.24*** 126.28*** 
# Of Samples 4,784 4,784 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
Max VIF 2.72 2.72 
 
Panel C. Logit Analysis Results 
UNWRT (1 or 0)=β0+ β1Bias(Accuracy)i,t+ β2HOUSE_MSi,t+ β3SAME_HSi,t+ β4HOUSE_ASTi,t+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent 
Variable 
Sign Dependent Variable=UNWRT 
BIAS ACCU Estimate Wald Chi-square 
Marginal 
Effect Estimate 
Wald Chi-
square 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept N/A N/A -6.921*** 24.21  -6.793*** 23.18  
BIAS(ACCU) − + -1.636*** 19.74 -0.113 1.980 28.35 0.014 
HOUSE_MS + 0.137 1.29 0.010 0.139 1.32 0.010 
SAME_HST + 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.071 0.11 0.003 
HOUST_AST + 0.220*** 11.26 0.015 0.209*** 10.11 0.014 
Pseudo R2 2.84% 3.21% 
Likelihood Ratio(χ2) 56.59*** 63.98*** 
# Of Samples 4,784 4,784 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2017 Volume 33, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 825 The Clute Institute 
As a second robustness check, we employ a least absolute deviated (LAD) 3  estimation methodology and run 
regressions (1) ~ (2). Gu and Wu (2003) argue that part of the observed analyst BIAS can be a result of analysts’ efforts 
to improve ACCU when the earnings distribution is skewed. Therefore, following the prior literature, we use LAD 
estimator to alleviate concerns that analysts’ true objective may be the minimization of mean absolute errors (Gu & 
Wu 2003; Basu & Markov 2004).  
 
As reported in the Panel A of Table 9, all variables show the expected significant relations except that the affiliated 
with underwriter variable (UNWRT) is insignificantly related with BIAS, even though it is positive. That is, the amount 
of bond issuance (MAGNI) and interaction of both variables (UNWRT×MAGNI) are positively (negatively) related 
with BIAS (ACCU) at least at the 10% or lower level. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in section 
5.  
 
As final robustness check, we re-estimated model (2) following methodology suggested by Petersen (2009). Petersen 
(2009) argues that in the study where panel data sets are used, OLS standard errors may be biased if the residuals are 
correlated across observation and the residuals are not independent. To control this problem, he shows that using 
standard errors clustered by firm and/or time is an effective approach to deter the problem. The Panel B of Table 9 
provides the results. As presented, adjusted t-values with clustered standard errors of UNWRT, MAGNI and 
UNWRT×MAGNI for BIAS (ACCU) are -2.13(2.23), -1.95(2.02) and -1.69(1.84), respectively, which are still 
statistically significant, indicating that incorporation of clustered standard errors into our models does not significantly 
change our main findings.  
 
 
Table 9. Regression Results Estimation of Least Absolute Deviation and clustered standard errors 
Panel A. Estimation of Least Absolute Deviation 
BIAS (or ACCU)= β0+ β1UNWRTi,t+ β2MAGNIi,t+ β3(UNWRT×MAGNI)i,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ β5LEVi,t+ β6VOLi,t+ β7BMi,t+ β8ROEi,t+ β9DGAPi,t  
+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent 
Variable 
Sign Dependent Variable = BIAS Dependent Variable = ACCU 
BIAS ACCURACY Estimate z-value Estimate z-value 
Intercept N/A N/A 0.010 0.73 -0.199*** -17.84 
UNWRT − + 0.002 1.60 0.002* 1.83 
MAGNI − + -0.264*** -41.94 0.166*** 33.98 
UNWRT×MAGNI − + -0.127*** -9.14 0.152*** 14.13 
Pseudo R2 11.58% 11.74% 
# Of Samples 13,588 13,588 
Market & Industry fixed fixed 
 
Panel B. Regression results of clustered standard errors 
BIAS (or ACCU)= β0+ β1UNWRTi,t+ β2MAGNIi,t+ β3(UNWRT×MAGNI)i,t+ β4SIZEi,t+ β5LEVi,t+ β6VOLi,t+ β7BMi,t+ β8ROEi,t+ β9DAYGAPi,t  
+ Industry_Fixed+ Year_Fixed+ υ 
Independent 
Variable 
Sign Dependent Variable = BIAS Dependent Variable = ACCU 
BIAS ACCURACY Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept N/A N/A 0.567* 1.80 -0.753** -2.57 
UNWRT − + -0.012** -2.13 0.013** 2.23 
MAGNI − + -0.543* -1.95 0.521** 2.02 
UNWRT×MAGNI − + -0.386* -1.69 0.397* 1.84 
SIZE ? ? -0.011 -1.37 0.013* 1.81 
LEV − + -0.184** -2.50 0.189*** 2.64 
VOL − + -0.209 -0.86 0.465** 2.14 
BM + − -0.004 -0.23 0.006 0.34 
ROE + − 0.090* 1.73 -0.070 -1.48 
DGAP − + -0.044*** -3.13 0.051*** 3.97 
Adj. R2 31.76% 34.65% 
F-value 15.28*** 11.16*** 
# of samples 13,588 13,588 
***,**,* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) or better, respectively. 
																																								 																				
3 We adopt LAD regression methodology for models 1 and 2 because the dependent variable of the model 3 is binary type.  
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we analyze the properties of analyst forecasts in the bond market when analysts face potential COI. 
When analysts are affiliated with security companies that provide underwriting services, we expect analysts to forecast 
more optimistically but less accurately for firms intending to issue bonds and these analysts’ forecasting behavior to 
increase the chance of securing underwriting contracts.  
 
During the period 2000 to 2008, we find that analysts forecast more optimistically but less accurately for firms 
intending to issue bonds, as expected, and that the amount of bond issuance also affects analysts to forecast more 
optimistically but less accurately. Furthermore, we find that analysts affiliated with security companies that eventually 
become underwriters issue more optimistic and less accurate forecasts than analysts affiliated with security companies 
that eventually do not become underwriters. We further document that security companies with analysts who issue 
more optimistic but less accurate forecasts are more likely to secure underwriting contracts. We go on to analyze the 
properties of analysts’ forecasts only with forecasts made before the underwriting contracts are determined and obtain 
qualitatively similar results to those of the full sample analysis. These results are consistent with the notion that 
analysts are affected by the mere existence of potential COI, and that bond issuing companies are also affected by 
these analysts’ forecasts because it may increase the chance to raise capital more cheaply due to higher valuations. 
 
Our results suggest that investors in the stock market need to discount more earnings forecasts for firms intending to 
issue bonds, especially made by analysts affiliated with security companies that provide underwriting service, even 
when forecasts are made before underwriting contracts. However, the following study limitations should be noted. 
Our results are based only on a short 9-year sample from only one country, which warrants cross country comparison 
study. Furthermore, our results do not suggest that analyst forecasts in the stock market are less optimistic and more 
accurate.  
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